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ABSTRACT 
This article explores the outcomes of performance-based financing for strengthening 
the health system in the context of state-building in the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
It focuses specifically on health system governance, which plays a pivotal role in the 
process of building the health system. Based on long-term qualitative field research, it 
examines the effectiveness of PBF in three areas of health system governance: structur-
al governance from a capacity-building perspective, health service-provision manage-
ment and demand-side empowerment for effective accountability. In general, the study 
found that PBF has positively impacted the process of health system-building in these 
three areas. Although much is still lacking, health governance and the provision of ser-
vices improved, while patient-centered care and social accountability strengthened the 
provider–patient relationship. However, donors, state officials and other stakeholders 
doubted their sustainability. In addition to structural threats related to state fragility 
and uncertain sustainability, transforming transactional motivation into transforma-
tional change is a challenge. Ultimately, PBF supports state-building in the health sec-
tor, but it cannot repair a collapsed state. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Health service effectiveness and accountability constitute major challenges in fragile 
states, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and trigger various innova-
tions and policy experiments. One of these is performance-based financing (PBF). PBF 
is the transfer of money or material goods from a funder or other supporter to a recipi-
ent, conditional to the recipient taking a measurable action or achieving a pre-
determined performance target (AIDSTAR-Two-Project 2011). In the health sector, 
PBF is understood as fee-for-service payments conditional to the quality of care and a 
health system approach to achieve results defined by quantity and quality of service 
outputs (NSHIP 2013). Healthcare providers are paid ‘for delivering specific services 
following explicit protocols with a system of inspection and auditing to assure compli-
ance and to raise quality’ (Musgrove 2010).  
Performance-based payments are also provided for the teams carrying out these inspec-
tions to motivate them to be thorough and accurate (Musgrove 2010, 4). Contracting for 
performance and motivating providers constitutes the core characteristics of the PBF 
approach. Inspired by a Rwandan PBF experiment, Cordaid, a Dutch NGO, introduced 
PBF in the South Kivu province (eastern DRC) in 2005 (Mayaka Manitu 2015). A 2012 
DRC government policy document regards PBF as a mechanism for public sector re-
form, in particular for health financing (MINISANTE/CTFBR 2012) and as a model 
promoting the adoption of a holistic perspective for strengthening the health system.  
 
THE EMERGENCE OF PERFORMANCE-BASED FINANCING IN INTERNATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
PBF emerged during the economic slowdown of the 1980s, the ‘lost development dec-
ade’, which facilitated the introduction of the New Public Management (NPM) reforms 
in the 1980s–1990s (Torfing and Triantafillou 2013). NPM focused on contracting for 
financing public service outputs, improving service standards while strengthening ac-
countability based on customer needs, managing by results, decentralizing authority and 
implementing participatory management (Rhodes 1996).  
PBF is regarded as a useful approach to financing health services that can work in both 
more stable environments and fragile states (Fritsche, Soeters and Meessen 2014). 
Compared with traditional bureaucratic approaches, PBF has achieved encouraging, but 
certainly not homogenous, results across countries (Soeters, 2012). These heterogene-
ous results indicate that contextual variables play an important role in explaining PBF 
successes. Therefore, understanding what causes the observed differences is crucial.  
The present study’s relevance lies in its exploratory inquiry of actual PBF outcomes for 
strengthening health system governance and state-building in a context of pervasive 
fragility. It provides empirical evidence on the health sector-building outcomes in the 
context of a fragile health system and multi-actor governance. Such governance implies 
a network of relevant actors and stakeholders linked through resource interdependence, 
cooperation, collaboration and even competition for achieving social goals (Koppenjan 
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and Klijn 2004). Driven by the need to explore the outcomes of PBF, as well as its po-
tential impact on state-building, we ask: What are the outcomes of strengthening the 
health system by means of PBF in the context of state-building in the DRC? 
This study explores the effectiveness of PBF in the DRC in light of its contextualized 
theory of change. A theory of change is the articulation of the underlying beliefs and 
assumptions that guide a service delivery strategy and are believed to be critical for pro-
ducing change and improvement (INSP 2005). Theories of change indicate causal con-
nections between activities and outcomes (Stein and Valters 2012), which require in-
sights on a contextual baseline and the intended changes. This investigation focused on 
PBF’s outcomes in three areas which are among the most affected by state fragility in 
the DRC health sector: 1) strengthening health governance; 2) management of service 
provision processes; and 3) demand-side empowerment for social accountability.  
 
STRENGTHENING HEALTH SYSTEM GOVERNANCE 
A health system consists of all the organizations, people and actions whose primary 
intent is to promote, restore or maintain health (World Health Organization 2007). 
Health system strengthening refers to improving the six building blocks of the system, 
namely governance/leadership, service-delivery, the health workforce, health infor-
mation, health financing and medical products, vaccines and technologies, as well as 
managing the interactions between them in ways that achieve more equitable and sus-
tained improvements across health services and outcomes (Ibid).  
The DRC health system is organized with a hierarchical architecture at three main lev-
els: 
1) the ministry of health (MoH) at the national level is in charge of national policy; 
 
2) the provincial ministry of public health (Ministère provincial de la santé) is the 
provincial branch of the national MoH for policy-implementation and coordina-
tion, its provincial health division (Division provinciale de la santé) plays an 
administrative role, whereas the provincial health inspectorate (Inspection pro-
vinciale de la santé) is its technical wing, and verifies whether health principles 
and standards are being respected in the province;1  
 
3) the Central Health Zone Office (Bureau Central de Zone de Santé (BCZ)), the 
Management Board of the General Referral Hospital (Comité de Gestion de 
l’Hopital Général de Référence) and the Health Centers (Centres de Santé ), 
each supported by its health development committee (Comité de Développe-
ment de l’Aire de Santé (CODESA)), at the operational health zone (HZ) level. 
The BCZ/HZ Office is the regulatory body at the HZ level. The Management 
Board of the General Referral Hospital and the CODESA are the organs for 
community participation in the management of the health facilities. Every 




Bwimana Aembe and Dennis Dijkzeul 
 
 International Public Management Review  Vol. 18, Iss. 2, 2018 
 www.ipmr.net   227 IPMR
The role of structural governance in strengthening the health system 
As one of the six building blocks, ‘health system governance involves ensuring that a 
strategic policy framework exists and is combined with effective oversight, coalition-
building, regulation, attention to system design and accountability’ (World Health Or-
ganization 2014). Two types of indicators have been proposed for measuring such gov-
ernance (World Health Organization 2010a): rule-based indicators measuring whether 
countries have appropriate policies, strategies and codified approaches for health system 
governance, and outcome-based indicators assessing whether rules and procedures are 
effectively implemented based on the experience of relevant stakeholders. The present 
study focuses on the outcome-based approach. 
In this respect, structural governance is about ‘how to structure or organize the state 
services, what strategic functions the state should perform, what to delegate to agencies, 
and which services to contract out; it is the question of how to manage the whole sys-
tem’ (Bresser-Pereira 2007). Health governance shapes the rules determining the behav-
iors of actors and establishes relevant networks and other institutions. Because of three 
characteristics of healthcare (information asymmetry, the difficulty of evaluating the 
product and the high costs of error) (Tuohy 2003), strengthening health governance is 
essential for community wellbeing. 
Through better governance, a health system can improve its ability to respond to various 
challenges, such as demographic, epidemiological, economic, political, medical, and 
social changes (Greer et al. 2016){Joseph,  2016:healthcare 56;Wang, 2012 #47}. Greer 
and colleagues (2016) have shown that, when governance is weak, the health system is 
plagued by corruption, misaligned incentives, […], unintended effects of ill-conceived 
policies, nepotism, incompetence, lack of trust and difficulties with long-term planning. 
In this vein, Lewis (2006, 6) argues that ‘in healthcare, good governance implies that 
healthcare systems function effectively and with some level of efficiency’. He further 
asserts that the production function represents the core of public healthcare systems, 
embodying capital, labor and governance, which together determine health outcomes. 
He maintains that increases in labor and capital can improve outcomes, but governance 
may either dampen or enhance these effects (Lewis 2006).  
Health governance involves at least three sets of actors: state actors (policy makers 
and/or politicians), providers, and beneficiaries/health service users (Health-Systems-
20/20 2012). Building on the World Bank’s service delivery and accountability frame-
work (Malena & Forster 2004), Brinkerhoff and Bossert (2008) have created a health 
governance triangle framework that defines the roles, rules, responsibilities and institu-
tions that shape the interactions among the three main sets of actors. These interactions 
include how governments respond to citizen demands, how providers and citizens en-
gage to improve service quality, and how citizen and provider groups advocate and re-
port on health concerns (Brinkerhoff and Bossert 2008). As the health sector is vital for 
the survival and health of all Congolese, and one of the main sectors in which citizens 
interact with the (remains of the) state, improving the governance of the health sector is 
also a crucial condition for improving overall governance in the DRC (Dijkzeul 2003).  
Performance-Based Financing DR Congo 
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Figure 1: Health Governance Triangle Model 
Source: (Brinkerhoff & Bossert, 2008) 
Ideally, the state (actors) and health providers establish a compact in which the state 
provides directives, assumes oversight, and ensures funding; the providers guarantee 
service delivery, provide information, report and lobby where necessary; and the citi-
zens/clients have a voice, sharing their preferences and expecting responsiveness from 
the state and providers. The citizens and health service providers should then develop a 
relationship, where the population provides feedback, inputs, and oversight on expected 
services (Ibid). In this ideal situation, clients/citizens convey their needs and demands 
for services, as well as their level of satisfaction, directly to the health service providers, 
who, in turn, offer a mix of quality services that satisfy the expressed needs and de-
mands. From a multi-actor governance perspective, however, the links between cli-
ents/citizens and providers are fraught with power and information asymmetries, capaci-
ty gaps, accountability failures, and inequities (Ibid).  
In fragile states, such an imbalanced relationship becomes even more problematic be-
cause a fragile statehood disempowers citizens. Good health governance therefore ra-
tionalizes the role of the government by ‘reducing its dominance and sharing roles with 
non-state actors; empowering citizens, civil society, and the private sector to assume 
new health sector roles and responsibilities; and creating synergies between the gov-
ernment and these actors’ (Ibid, 10). The main difference with the literature and triangle 
above in the DRC is of course that donor governments and international organizations 
also play a crucial role in structural governance, and in this case in promoting and fund-
ing PBF. In fact, they sustain the health system by supporting policy-making and fi-
nancing policy implementation and processes of service delivery at the operational lev-
el. Donor organizations thus simultaneously substitute for and strengthen the govern-
ment. 
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The underlying principles of PBF 
The principles of PBF have the potential to strengthen governance. They emphasize the 
operational relevance of the market and corporate governance for the health system. As 
applied in the health system, they have a clear division of labor for the actors involved, 
commitment to health quality, constructive competition among the actors, public–
private partnership, management autonomy of health structures, contracting, transparen-
cy and verification for social accountability, the rational management of funding to en-
sure financial viability of health facilities, and, most importantly, person-centered care, 
which considers the population as both beneficiaries and clients whose voice counts 
(Cordaid and SINA-Health 2012; MINISANTE/CTFBR 2012; Toonen and Bertam 
2012; Witter et al. 2013). 
Such person-centered care and support places service users at the center of delivery by 
supporting their needs, protecting their rights, respecting their values, preferences and 
diversity, and actively involving them in the provision of care (HIQA/Ireland 2012). 
Ideally, person-centered care promotes kindness, consideration and respect for service 
users’ dignity, privacy and autonomy (HIQA/Ireland 2012, 25).  
Additionally, the emphasis on the division of labor is meant to ensure transparency 
(Cordaid and SINA-Health 2012; Toonen and Bertam 2012; Witter et al. 2013). PBF’s 
operational setup promotes interdependent actors, complementary and clearly distinct 
roles for stakeholders, and mechanisms for service quality verification. The inclusion of 
community-based organizations (CBOs) in the verification of interventions and their 
outcomes also reflects the ideals of empowering beneficiaries and promoting social ac-
countability. Yet, the PBF principles have rarely been fully implemented in the DRC 
health sector. 
 
OVERVIEW OF THE INTRODUCTION OF PBF IN LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES  
The use of PBF in lower and middle-income countries as a health sector financing tool 
can be traced to early experimentation with market forces in primary healthcare 
(Fritsche et al. 2014). This experimentation took place in the publicly funded and pro-
vided health system in Zambia’s Western Province in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
with the purpose of co-financing primary healthcare (Ibid). In Cambodia and Haiti in 
1999, NGOs were contracted either to provide health services or to give management 
support to government-provided health services (Eichler et al. 2009). In both countries, 
these contracts were output-based, or fixed-price contracts known as performance-based 
contracts (Loevinsohn 2008). In Afghanistan, performance-based contracting was intro-
duced as a national strategy for health service delivery in 2003 (Fritsche et al. 2014). 
The Cambodian experiments exhibited operational differences between two contracting 
models: Sotnikum and Pearang (Mayaka Manitu 2015). The Sotnikum experiment was 
done within the public sector as a contracting-in model with a purchasing agency and 
steering committee closely linked to the national health sector hierarchy (Ibid). The 
Pearang experiment adopted a contracting-out model in which the autonomous external 
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purchaser agency (e.g., an international NGO or a local agency) assumes responsibility 
for the monitoring and follow-up of implementation. Contracting out has become the 
model advocated by donors, who lack trust in the public sector in crisis countries (Ibid).  
Since 2002, PBF has been developed further in Rwanda (Fritsche et al. 2014). The 
Rwandan government adopted the contracting-out model to decentralize and improve 
governance (Mayaka Manitu 2015). However, it later switched to the contracting-in 
approach, because it was reluctant to shift power to international NGOs and wanted to 
introduce PBF to the whole public sector (Ibid). Following this shift, PBF has expanded 
rapidly in Africa. In 2008, the Rwandan government scaled PBF up by adopting it in its 
national health policy. In 2013, there were three countries (Sierra Leone, Rwanda and 
Burundi) with nationwide PBF programs and 17 with ongoing pilots (Fritsche, Soeters, 
& Meessen, 2014).2 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Research Design, Data Collection and Participants 
Empirical data for this qualitative study was collected in the Katana HZ, which is locat-
ed in Kabare territory, 50 km north of Bukavu, South Kivu province’s capital. This HZ 
is composed of one general referral hospital (Fomulac (Fondation Médicale de 
l’Université de Louvain en Afrique Centrale) hospital), one reference health center (Bi-
rava) and 17 health centers that took part in the PBF experiment. We visited 15 of these 
health centers. In addition, to explore the national-level PBF design, adoption and up-
take, complementary research was conducted in Kinshasa at the national ministry of 
health (MoH), in Bukavu at the provincial ministry of public health, at Cordaid offices 
(in Bukavu and Kinshasa) and in the Idjwi HZ. We also interviewed health management 
officers from the International Rescue Committee (IRC), Integrated Health Project 
(Projet de Santé Intégré, PROSANI), Louvain Coopération au Développement and Bu-
reau Diocésain des Oeuvres Médicales (BDOM). Primary data was collected using 
three methods from August 2013 to April 2015. 
1. Participant observation 
This kind of observation of efforts to implement PBF took place in two settings: 
First, at the provincial health inspectorate/ division to investigate PBF outcomes on 
policy coalition-building between state institutions, donor/INGO organizations (es-
pecially Cordaid), Agence d’Achat de Performances (AAP) and providers at both 
provincial health inspectorate/division and the HZ level.3 Second, at health facilities 
in Katana, in particular to explore the level of internalization of PBF principles re-
garding patient-centeredness, and to study the providers’ motivation and health gov-
ernance practices. 
2. Focus groups 
These were organized with providers, CBOs, such as the CODESAs, and communi-
ty members.  
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3. Interviews 
In-depth interviews were mostly conducted with key-informants from the state, do-
nors/INGOs and FBOs (e.g., BDOM) in both Bukavu and Kinshasa. Semi-structured 
interviews were designed for all (potential) participants, but their applicability de-
pended mostly on the profile and availability of the respondents. 
Baseline assessment 
To assess the baseline situation in the health sector, we also conducted a content analy-
sis of the four main policy papers:  
o the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (Second Generation, 2011-
2015)(International Monetary Fund, 2007; RDC/MINIPLAN, 2011); 
o the Health System Strengthening Strategy (RDC/MINISANTE, 2006); 
o the National Health Development Plan (2011–2015)(RDC/MINISANTE, 2010); 
and  
o the 2011-2015 National Health Human Resources Development Plan 
(RDC/MINISANTE, 2011). 
Data Analysis 
To identify the main themes in our data and to structure them in a useful way (Attride-
Stirling, 2001), we used NVivo software to conduct a thematic network analysis revolv-
ing around four main themes: i) state fragility; ii) governance and actors; iii) service 
delivery; and iv) provider-patient relationships. 
Fieldwork Challenges 
Health providers working at the health facilities without state pay tend to believe that, 
with PBF, the money follows the patient and good figures make good rewards; hence, 
they feel tempted to exaggerate positive PBF outcomes. Gaining access to representa-
tives of some international NGOs also proved to be a challenge. Finally, corruption is 
rife in the DRC and can be a survival strategy, but it is dangerous or shameful to talk 
openly about it. 
 
FINDINGS ON PBF AND HEALTH SYSTEM-BUILDING OUTCOMES 
This section first discusses the baseline for assessing the outcomes of PBF. It then ex-
amines whether the PBF experiments have 1) built a policy coalition for improved gov-
ernance of the health sector; 2) improved the management of service delivery; and 3) 
empowered local communities. 
The Baseline Situation for Grasping Outcomes of PBF’s Theory of Change 
Based on the content analysis of official national-level policy papers and in-line with 
the six WHO building blocks, we identified the different types of problems affecting the 
health system in the DRC. Table 1 presents the main ones: 
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Table 1: Main Problems 
Affected areas of health system Problems noted 
1. Governance/leadership 
1. Deficient policy making, policy implementation 
and social accountability; 
2. Poor normative power and weak coordination ca-
pability; 
3. Politicization of the sector management; 
4. Absence of anti-corruption mechanisms; 
5. Low concern about the broader social determinants 
of public health; 
6. Poor empowerment of the population regarding 
their roles in public health and social accountability 
of both providers and the state 
2. Service delivery 
1. Poor coverage in terms of geography and financial 
affordability; 
2. Survival strategy (débrouillez vous) resulting in a 
high rate of turnover and commodification of 
health services, gaming, multitasking and parallel 
structures; 
3. Unclear referral procedures; 
4. Low proportion of specialized/qualified staff 
members; 
5. Inadequate conditions in health facilities, many of 
which are housed in private premises. 
3. The health workforce 
1. Little or no salary paid to health providers, espe-
cially nurses; 
2. Unmotivated and frustrated staff; 
3. Uneven distribution of health staff between rural 
and urban/semi-urban HZs; 
4. Unethical advancement in position and the absence 
of provision for retirement (and no severance pay 
at all); 
5. Profusion of below-standard health training institu-
tions. 
4. Health information 
1. Regulation for health system information is obso-
lete; 
2. Poor information flow; 
3. Poor dissemination of public policy. 
5. Health Financing 
1. Weak public funding and low disbursement rate of 
the budget; 
2. Over-dependence on donors. 
6. Medical products, vaccines, and 
technology  
1. Poor availability and management of drugs and 
health technologies; 
2. Weak compliance with both procurement mecha-
nisms and the state supply policy through the Na-
tional System for Medical Essentials Procurement 
Source: Composed by the authors, based on International Monetary Fund, 2007; RDC/MINIPLAN, 2011; 
RDC/MINISANTE, 2006, 2010, 2011. 
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Analysis of these policy documents reveals the extent to which deficiencies permeate 
the entire health system. These malfunctions relate to the weakness of the state and gov-
ernance functions. Cordaid’s theory of change for PBF initiatives aims to strengthen 
state leadership and structural governance. It offers a contextualized approach oriented 
towards state-building (see below).  
The Introduction of PBF in the DRC 
During the height of the Congolese crisis in the late 1990s, Medical Emergency Relief 
International (Merlin) attempted to enforce a contracting system in the health sector to 
improve access to healthcare while strengthening the capacity and quality of the local 
healthcare system in a situation of chronic crisis (Dijkzeul and Lynch 2005). This ap-
proach, which pioneered the contract system in the DRC, made a subsidy dependent on 
the performance of each health facility, although Merlin did not enter into the internal 
running of the health facilities and, especially, human resource management. However, 
the implementation of this contract approach did not fully succeed, because Merlin 
needed to build the capacity of the health system first (Dijkzeul & Lynch, 2005).  
Just Crossing Ruzizi River: From Rwanda into South Kivu  
In 2005, with Cordaid funding, the Bukavu BDOM embraced PBF. To introduce PBF, a 
learning mission to Rwanda (where Cordaid was implementing a project in Cyangugu) 
took place in 2004. This visit enabled Cordaid to launch its first Congolese PBF exper-
iment in 2006 on Idjwi island (Mayaka Manitu 2015; Peerenboom, de Weerd, Mushaga-
lusa, Zabiti and Vroerg 2015).  
Since then, various PBF experiments have been carried out and they have differed in 
terms of design, operation, and effectiveness (Bertone, Mangala, Kwete and Derriennic 
2011). The most important PBF experiments took place with the World Bank (in the 
provinces of former Equateur, Maniema, former Katanga, Bandudu and Kinshasa), the 
European Commission with EU funding from the 9th European Development Fund (EU-
PS9FED) (in Kasai Oriental, the former Kasai Occidental, the former Province Oriental 
and North Kivu) and Cordaid (in South Kivu and Bas-Congo) (Bertone et al. 2011).  
In 2010, PBF initiatives covered 26 million Congolese and took place in 189 of 515 
HZs (Bertone et al. 2011), but used different operational models. The EU projects ex-
perimented with contracting in, whereas Cordaid’s projects tested a contracting-out 
model. Cordaid initially had a contracting-in model under the EU-PS9FED funding, but 
it failed to show conclusive evidence of its effectiveness (Ibid). The EU and World 
Bank-funded PBF experiments did not successfully apply the underlying principles of 
PBF, especially the division of labor and rational use of funding by public actors. For 
example, the work funded by EU-PS9FED was impaired by unclear definitions of roles 
and divisions of functions between health system management and providers (Lafort, 
Letournmy and Koussémou 2012). Moreover, in the DRC, where corruption is perva-
sive, contracting in through state institutions faces obstacles due to weak management 
and low financial accountability. However, Cordaid’s contracting out PBF experiments 
with AAP as the external purchasing agency (see below) in South Kivu—the focus of 
the present study—and Bas-Congo have done relatively well. 
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PBF in Katana HZ: The Story of Cordaid’s Engagement with Health System 
Strengthening 
Fomulac Hospital became part of Katana HZ during the subdivision of the national ter-
ritory into HZs in 1985 (RDC/MINISANTE 2006). Fomulac hospital was founded in 
1928 and became one of the most famous health facilities in the African Great Lakes 
region during the colonial period. Until 2002, the Fomulac general referral hospital was 
managed as a Belgian project and had a strong reputation for service quality. From 2002 
to 2005, the management was transitioned from Louvain University to BDOM. This 
was meant as a return to self-reliance in the aftermath of the wars, but it plunged the HZ 
into an emergency situation. The effects of war on the population’s lives, poverty and 
the localization of management severely challenged operations in the HZ. To improve 
service quality and strengthen HZ management, Cordaid introduced PBF in Katana HZ 
in 2006. 
Cordaid has supported PBF programs in the health, education and rural development 
sectors since 2011, as well as in selected public administration offices (KIT 2013). Cor-
daid and the Netherlands Cooperation have so far been the main funders of PBF for 
health interventions (Peerenboom et al. 2015). Stakeholders consider Cordaid’s experi-
ments to be the showcase of the underlying PBF principles. Due to the success of these 
experiments, Cordaid ‘has been facilitating networking and sharing of experiences and 
lessons learnt with PBF to improve access to and quality of health services’ (Cordaid 
2013).  
Based on its theory of change, Cordaid aims to establish a clear division of labor among 
the actors in the health system where they mutually control each other, and it provides 
financial support as an incentive for them to strengthen their governance, policies and 
service-delivery. Its interventions intend to strengthen the role of the state as a regulato-
ry body, promote social accountability at the system management and service provision 
levels, and meet providers’ expectations regarding decent payment for the delivered 
outputs. Hence, PBF anticipates agency problems that arise when the desires of the 
principal and agent conflict (Eisenhardt, 1989). Cordaid thus strongly engages these 
actors during implementation, and carries out regular monitoring and evaluation activi-
ties, ultimately hoping to instil real transformational change towards more patient-
centered care in the health sector. Transformational change denotes an intrinsic motiva-
tion or desire to improve healthcare based on internalized social values of staff members 
of the health system. 
AAP: A Crucial Actor for the Implementation of PBF 
In line with Cordaid’s contracting-out model, AAP is the autonomous external purchas-
ing agent and local fund-holder agency for PBF in South Kivu (Agence d'Achat de Per-
formance, 2011). It is in charge of mobilizing funding, managing donor funding, ration-
al management of PBF finances, solving agency problems at the service delivery level, 
overseeing implementation of PBF principles, and contracting with providers 
(Peerenboom et al. 2015). According to PBF’s underlying principles, AAP is accounta-
ble to the state and to the community through the CODESA (Ibid, 4-7). According to 
DRC health policy, the CODESA not only owns local health facilities, but as communi-
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ty-based committees they also ensure interactive communication between the communi-
ty and health providers. In the current contracting-out model, AAP is a private but pub-
lic interest-oriented organization that interacts with all key actors involved in the im-
plementation of PBF experiments in South Kivu. Therefore, AAP confers with state 
actors and donor organizations at a provincial level, and purchases health services at 
every level of the local health system. 
At the operational level, AAP contracts health service providers at the HZ level (espe-
cially the HZ Management Board, the Referral Hospital Management Board and the 
CODESA—under the leadership of the health center’s principal nurse (infirmier titu-
laire). AAP purchases health outputs and verifies the health facility records (le vérifica-
teur).  
At the provincial and HZ levels, AAP participates with providers and regulators in de-
fining performance indicators in light of the national health policy and professional 
standards of healthcare provision. At both levels, AAP plays a key role in the process of 
output evaluation. 
 
PBF AND THE DRC NATIONAL HEALTH POLICY 
With the renewal of international cooperation in 2001–2002, donors’ engagement in the 
DRC grew exponentially (Arnould and Vlassenroot 2016). Over time and through do-
nors’ initiatives, the government engaged in contracting within the health sector, issuing 
a first policy framework (Vade-Mecum du Parténariat dans le Secteur de la Santé) for 
these contracting arrangements (RDC/MINISANTE 2002). Officially, the process of 
promoting contracting initiatives was endorsed nationally with the adherence of the 
government to the Paris Declaration in 2005. This was followed by the adoption of a 
strategy to strengthen the health system in 2006. 
As shown, external donors had already initiated PBF in the health sector. The first PBF 
experiments in South Kivu did not include the national level. Mayaka Manitu (2015) 
has characterized this initial lack of collaboration between the project and the central 
level as disconnecting PBF from institutional memory. Only in 2010 did a high-level 
meeting at the ministry of health in Kinshasa review the experiments. This opened the 
way for the government to formally consent to using PBF as an approach to health sec-
tor financing. The meeting assessed PBF’s strengths, weaknesses and the modalities of 
its implementation in light of the different experiments. It concluded that the underlying 
principles of PBF and its outcomes regarding health system-building and health-service 
quality outperformed the traditional input model, which is a procedural/processual fi-
nancing model (Ssengooba, McPake and Palmer 2012). Without abolishing the tradi-
tional model, the national MoH adopted the PBF model and encouraged its implementa-
tion at the operational level. At the end of the meeting, the government and its partners 
signed a memorandum of understanding on the adoption of PBF (RDC/MINSANTE 
2012a). A direct outcome of this memorandum was the setup of an ad hoc PBF branch 
(Cellule Technique du Financement Basé sur les Résultats, CTFBR) at the national 
MoH tasked with the internalization of PBF principles (Ibid). 
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Cordaid and the CTFBR have concentrated efforts to mobilize state officials to adopt 
PBF at both national and provincial levels. As for South Kivu, the provincial ministry of 
public health declared PBF, along with community-based health insurance, as health 
system financing models for the province in 2011. However, at present, PBF survives 
only because of its external promoters. 
PBF Experiments and Strengthening Health Sector Governance in South Kivu 
Reinforcing a policy coalition for structural health governance 
The structural setup of PBF and its theory of change require coalition-building around a 
set of values for active partnerships between the state, providers, civil society and donor 
organizations. We assessed the extent to which PBF has created a policy coalition 
among its stakeholders. Almost all informants were enthusiastic about PBF, which they 
considered to be better than the input model for health system-building. However, this 
enthusiasm was mainly based on the experiences of other countries and pilot experi-
ments in South Kivu and Bas-Congo. Stakeholders praised the PBF approach for pro-
moting a policy coalition based on the ideals of service productivity and quality im-
provement. They mentioned strategic interdependence and division of labor among the 
actors, the decentralization of operational decisions, operational flexibility, and social 
accountability as its distinguishing features. At each level, the actors involved seemed 
to be aware of their roles and the outcomes of their engagement.  
Hence, PBF promotes interactive collaboration among stakeholders to strengthen the 
structural governance of public health institutions. The implementation of PBF occurs at 
all three levels of the health system: central, provincial and operational (MINI-
SANTE/CTFBR 2012). State agencies from the three levels constitute the regulatory 
body, and healthcare providers include clinical staff members as well as public organi-
zations and international and local NGOs. In Kinshasa and Bukavu, as well as at the 
service provision level in Katana, we observed actors’ readiness to collaborate, and their 
awareness of strategic interdependence and the necessary roles at these three levels of 
structural governance. 
At the national MoH, PBF interventions revolve around macro-level national health 
governance, especially in terms of policy-making and regulation. The Comité National 
de Pilotage Santé (CNP, National Health Steering Committee) is the high-level national 
platform for state and donor interactions. Donors, the state and national PBF-related 
organizations such as CTFBR and Agence de Gestion Financière (AGF, Financial Man-
agement Agency) participate in the CNP, where they take high-level decisions regarding 
health sector governance: policy making and implementation, sector priorities, sector 
management and harmonization and coordination of interventions. At this level, PBF is 
referred to as an approach that reinforces health sector funding, health system manage-
ment, and promotes the internalization of good health governance principles.  
At the provincial level, the PBF approach focuses on implementing national policy and 
enforcing its principles. State institutions act as regulators, verifiers and providers under 
the PBF principles. Hence, Cordaid established performance-based contracts with the 
Provincial Health Inspectorate. Pursuant to PBF guidance, the provincial ministry of 
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public health evaluates the performance of the provincial health inspectorate and the 
provincial health division. With donors’ support, the provincial health inspectorate and 
AAP evaluate the performance of HZs and, in turn, the HZ Central Office (BCZ) evalu-
ates the performance of its health centers. Every structure has its respective action and 
quality assurance indicators for performance evaluation. The main regulatory structure 
at the provincial level for the enforcement of PBF, overall health sector governance and 
stakeholders’ coalition-building is the Comité Provincial de Pilotage Santé (CPPS, Pro-
vincial Health Steering Committee), which is the Provincial CNPS. The CPPS is under 
the administrative direction of the governor of the province.  
In South Kivu, the PBF approach promotes and strengthens coalitions among state insti-
tutions, international NGOs, CBOs and the community. For example, all PBF stake-
holders in South Kivu are involved in context analysis, identification of needs, setting 
objectives, defining indicators and performance evaluation. The state representative, as 
a regulator, endorses the identified indicators and contracts with external partners. AAP 
takes the lead in monitoring and fund management and contracts with all of the provid-
ers, including frontline service providers, public health sector officials and other institu-
tions involved in the process, and CBOs.4 
Not only do donor organizations and INGOs such as Cordaid support the activities of 
the state and AAP, but they also participate in monitoring and outcome evaluations of 
PBF experiments. Cordaid’s officer in charge of health described the contextualized 
philosophy behind PBF’s theory of change as ‘neither working for nor against, but with 
the state, in order to reinforce its leadership role’.5 
PBF sensitizes stakeholders about health financing reform at the national and provincial 
levels. At both levels, the MoH viewed PBF as a good model for health system financ-
ing and implementing a division of labor among key stakeholders. The MoH bodies 
assume the regulatory role, the HZs play the role of provider and AAP raises and allo-
cates funding. CBOs provide the community voice. According to AAP, this division of 
labor was initially difficult because many actors were not ready for accountability.6 An 
AAP representative noted that the state actors had not experienced a system where they 
did not have control over the financial management. A provincial health official assert-
ed that ‘we do appreciate Cordaid mostly for the introduction of [the] PBF approach, 
which actually entices providers to positive competition for health quality’.7 
Implementation of PBF at the health centers concerns mostly the process of service-
delivery and working conditions. AAP contracts with individual facilities (Health Cen-
ters, and the General Reference Hospital, as well as with the BCZ) for PBF implementa-
tion. 
The state, donors and providers have constructed a PBF community policy for health 
sector financing reform. In its implementation, PBF supports capacity-building, which 
is an essential function of health governance. Capacity-building, in turn, contributes to 
the institutionalization of good governance practices. In sum, Cordaid attempts to 
strengthen local civil society and state institutions at all levels. 
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PBF as a tool for institutionalizing mechanisms for good governance 
PBF supports the regulatory function of the provincial ministry of public health and the 
national MoH. The regulatory outcomes can be identified at multiple levels. State-level 
entities improve their knowledge regarding their roles and obtain the necessary financial 
support to fulfil them. Officials at the provincial ministry of public health and the pro-
vincial health inspectorate asserted that the approach has been motivating public offi-
cials to internalize good practices through contracts. A primary healthcare official with-
in the provincial health inspectorate maintained, ‘In line with PBF, staff members un-
derstand that when you deliver expected results, you gain; when you do not perform, 
you put yourself in the situation of a loser’.8 At the provincial health division, contract-
ing has improved output performance and administrative accountability. Although not 
all provincial health offices have thus far initiated PBF contracts,9 in those that have, the 
culture of accountability instilled by PBF was acknowledged by the head of the provin-
cial health inspectorate: ‘PBF improves service quality … in terms of department func-
tioning, effective administration, monitoring and local participation’. 
Capacity-building and collaboration through PBF helps to improve human resource de-
velopment. Cordaid’s repeated interactions and meetings with the state entities promot-
ed good health governance, provider performance, patient-centeredness, and strength-
ened outcomes. Observations from PBF stakeholder meetings revealed how important 
these interactions have been for improving health governance. Although PBF cannot 
right all of the wrongs that have long impaired the sector, its contribution is certainly 
appreciated. In this respect, a representative of Cordaid Kinshasa stated, ‘we do not say 
PBF will solve all problems in the health sector; but PBF rationalizes health sector gov-
ernance, promotes creativity and raises awareness on state, providers’ and beneficiaries’ 
responsibilities’.10 Regular meetings between the Cordaid and AAP teams and the three 
provincial health institutions dealt mostly with PBF uptake and implementation, health 
sector management and community needs assessment, joint endorsement of HZ reports, 
monitoring initiatives and accountability. These meetings also considered department 
output reporting, health facilities’ action plans submitted to donor organizations and 
health service provision processes. These iterative interactions are important for the 
internalization of good governance practices in the health department and HZ regarding 
health service provision processes. However, for AAP, the internalization of good gov-
ernance practices require a great deal of patience, because it has been a challenge to 
transform the mentality of the actors involved.11  
PBF and Improving Health Service Provision Management in the Katana HZ 
Health providers’ motivation and strengthening management 
The entrenched carelessness of the state for social welfare has ossified lax public ser-
vice. Everyone struggles firstly for their own survival, transforming public services into 
assets that civil servants exchange for their personal benefit. Describing this tendency, 
an official at the national MoH noted that ‘civil workers get recruited but cannot live off 
their jobs’. This was confirmed by another official at the provincial health inspectorate: 
‘You manage your life from what you do on a daily basis; we live from hand to mouth 
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[such] that it is hard to apply for holiday [or] be ready for [an] occupational retreat’.12 
This explains the persistence of the self-serving behaviors that were repeatedly reported.  
Through performance contracting, PBF anticipates this problem by providing guaran-
tees to both the principal and the agent. In one of the focus groups with the Katana 
management board, the participants discussed the relevance of the PBF approach ac-
cording to their professional experience. For them, PBF enables the providers and the 
community to focus on the common ideal of public health improvement. In contrast to 
input-based interventions, which are mostly procedural, PBF prescribes analyzing the 
baseline situation and the overall context before defining intervention objectives. Im-
portantly, the participants stressed extrinsic rewards, which they presented as a distin-
guishing factor of PBF: ‘PBF allows for motivating the agent and living up to the popu-
lation needs’.13 
Nurses at a remote health center (in Izimero) unanimously lauded PBF as it was imple-
mented by AAP. According to one of nurses, ‘without AAP and PBF we would not 
have survived. May God bless AAP. May it live long as a lake’ [arhame nka-ngadja, in 
the Mashi language]. For a nurse this stance is understandable, because most nurses 
either erratically receive a small monthly payment or nothing at all from the state. The 
best paid may get at most 27,000.00 CDF (27.00 USD), and some may receive less than 
9,000.00 CDF (9.00 USD) a month, but most receive nothing at all. In South Kivu, in 
2012, there were 8,121 known health workers, of which only 732 received some salary; 
the rest received nothing from the state’.14 The economic survival of civil servants pre-
sents an existential problem with professional repercussions. The magnitude of dysfunc-
tion in human resource management affects performance, service quality and profes-
sionalization. PBF addresses this situation by helping to solve the agency problem, and 
is crucial for rational health reform. 
Although motivation through financial incentives is crucial in PBF, there are also other 
sources of motivation. In this respect, providers praised capacity-building. A member of 
the Katana HZ noted that all contracting agents undergo on-the-job training to enhance 
productivity and quality. In a similar vein, the HZ administrator maintained that, before 
the introduction of PBF, it was difficult to recruit paramedic staff, such as laboratory 
technicians. As PBF responds to the basic needs of the facility and population, staffing 
gaps were closed in all covered HZs: ‘PBF […] has really contributed much to improv-
ing work regarding both inputs and infrastructure’.15  
PBF also leads to improvements in task-oriented behavior. Staff members tended to 
respect the performance principles promoted by PBF, striving for efficiency and ex-
pected outputs. Although their motivation is still mostly transactional (incentive-based), 
it has been a good starting point. Improved task-oriented behaviors were reported in 
many dimensions, such as reporting, industriousness and human sensitivity, as well as 
in information accuracy and timeliness. The Provincial Health Inspector asserted that 
the reports received from PBF-covered HZs were clearer and more accurate than those 
received from non-PBF sites, because reporting quality and the reliability of intelligence 
are among the indicators.  
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PBF and improving service delivery 
For many health officials and providers ‘PBF is a good initiative that improves the qual-
ity of services’.16 The Katana HZ Administrator held that, since PBF was introduced, 
the rate of health service utilization, which had plummeted when the Belgians handed 
over the management of the hospital, has increased again.17 There is thus a causal rela-
tionship between governance and management, and between the implementation of PBF 
and improvement in service delivery outcomes. Above all, improvements in patient-
centered care are being championed.  
Health providers and community members generally agreed that PBF has had positive 
outcomes regarding responsiveness in Katana. Only a few people complained about the 
unsympathetic attitudes of some providers and a disconnect between the claimed service 
provision improvements and the real quality of services. Of the 15 health centers visit-
ed, only one was criticized for uncaring behavior. This low number of grievances does 
not call into question the overall positive effects of PBF on health outcomes. For exam-
ple, across health centers, when community members were asked whether they were 
satisfied with the way healthcare services were being delivered at their health facility, 
they attested to significant improvements in the provider–patient relationship and con-
text-sensitive pricing. Overall, with PBF, the communities’ perceptions of health service 
provision and health providers is improving.  
The rational management of drugs and other medical supplies achieved through opera-
tional planning is another aspect of PBF. On the basis of health facilities’ action plans 
and indicators, medical products should be managed carefully with PBF indicators. The 
users of health services in different communities testified to improvements in terms of 
drug availability, frequency of visits, utilization and professionalism. However, not all 
health centers received the same appreciation of their performance. Additionally, the 
improvement in the availability of drugs has differed among health centers. Community 
members complained about recurrent shortages of drugs in many health centers, and 
the prevailing practice was to prescribe medications for patient self-procurement. All in 
all, the situation was generally reported to be improving, although reaching a satisfacto-
ry level will require further commitments from both the state and donors. 
PBF and Demand-side Empowerment for Social Accountability 
Active community participation in the process of verifying health facilities’ perfor-
mance empowers the population as key stakeholders in service provision and manage-
ment. Such participatory verification is crucial for validating health facilities’ perfor-
mance reports. There are two kinds of verification: internal/technical or objective verifi-
cation, and external or subjective verification (RDC/MINSANTE 2012). Internal verifi-
cation refers to technical tools and/or administrative principles regarding clinical or 
biomedical consultation guidelines and administrative reporting effectiveness. This kind 
of verification is conducted regularly (on a monthly and quarterly basis) by AAP and 
state representatives within health facilities. External verification, also known as quality 
verification, is conducted by an independent team of experts and CBO representatives, 
including CODESA members. Quality verification focuses mostly on cross-checking 
the reliability of the data provided by the health facilities with the beneficiaries, as well 
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as their degree of satisfaction. AAP noted that community members had rejected incor-
rect or fraudulent statements incorporated in some of the facility reports.18 
For some participants, multitasking observed at AAP as fund-holder, external purchaser 
and especially verifier is a weak spot in the implementation of PBF. Multitasking was 
mentioned as a potential obstacle to both rational management of funding and adminis-
trative accountability. 
Still, PBF empowers communities through promoting patient-centered care, recognizing 
their rights to contribute to the process of service provision as both clients and benefi-
ciaries. PBF engages CBOs, in particular CODESAs, which, in turn, are requested to 
raise awareness of community entitlements. In the rural zones, such as Katana, commu-
nity empowerment is crucial for social accountability and voice. In the DRC, communi-
ty participation is ‘poorly understood’ (RDC/MINISANTE 2006). However, ‘with PBF, 
the community has become an active stakeholder aware of their statutory roles’.19 
In addition, Cordaid also implements a program called PBF–community, which aims to 
empower the community to interact productively with healthcare providers. The com-
munity is represented mostly through its CODESA, which also serves as the interface 
between the health facilities and the community. As such, the CODESA members work 
to convey the population’s aspirations to the health facilities but also to sensitize the 
community on health-related issues. Community members stated that, although the situ-
ation has not yet sufficiently improved, there have been some promising changes. Par-
ticipation patterns have begun to shift from nominal participation to interactive partici-
pation. The community-empowerment initiative has strengthened the collaboration be-
tween health facilities and the community through performance verification.  
Unfortunately, state weakness disempowers active participation in the provision of 
health services. The population’s voice is still too weak to achieve full social accounta-
bility. Four factors explain this weakness. First, the concept of community is blurred. In 
a context permeated by social patronage and conflict, it is not always clear who belongs 
to the community or how one becomes a community representative. Second, health 
workers have become increasingly self-regulated and lax in the quasi-absence of the 
effective regulatory power of the state. Third, in rural zones, providers enjoy social 
power over most poor communities. Fourth, there is inadequate understanding of the 




In sum, health officials consider PBF interventions more important than any other type 
of interventions to improve performance and strengthen health sector governance. How-
ever, there are critical challenges to institutionalizing good governance practices related 
to both the shift among providers from a transactional incentive-based motivation to 
transformational behavioral change and the assertiveness of the state in its stewardship 
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role through which the welfare of the community and the providers should be champi-
oned.  
Despite criticism on AAP’s multitasking, most respondents expressed their (relative) 
optimism about further strengthening health service governance, service provision man-
agement improvement and community-centered healthcare.  
Almost all participants appreciated PBF outputs and even outcomes regarding institu-
tionalizing good governance practices, but only a handful could imagine the sustainabil-
ity of PBF without donors. Moreover, the current socio-economic system, insecurity, 
and especially fragile statehood continue to influence PBF negatively, as they have with 
other donors’ interventions in the DRC. The overall context of public management, 
characterized by endemic corruption (Trefon 2011), undermines social accountability 
and the success of development interventions. Therefore, scaling up PBF to the whole 
country and achieving sustainability appear to be insurmountable challenges at this 
moment. However, the findings of this study have underlined the potential of PBF for 
motivating staff to increasingly deliver commendable outputs, despite fragile statehood. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This study explored PBF’s health-building outcomes and the strengthening of health 
governance in light of PBF’s contextualized theory of change. It noted problems in all 
six building blocks of the health system. In response, our analysis revolved around three 
types of outcomes of PBF for structural health governance: 1) strengthening health gov-
ernance in terms of the state’s regulatory capacity and coalition-building; 2) health ser-
vice provision management, which concerns providers and service-delivery processes; 
and 3) demand-side empowerment, which is a requisite for social accountability. 
Regarding strengthening health governance, PBF reinforces structural governance of 
health sector organization, management and accountability. PBF empowers the state 
with organizational capacities while also helping to institutionalize good governance 
practices. It supports the government’s regulatory role, coalition-building and social 
accountability through enforcing national policy, division of labor and patient-centered 
care. Through structural governance building and the institutionalization of good prac-
tices, PBF mediates the setting of goals and ideals, as well as building a coalition to 
work for their implementation. In contrast to other interventions, PBF renders the state 
more actively visible in system design, coalition-building, regulation and stakeholders’ 
interactive collaboration. 
Concerning the outcomes of service provision processes management in Katana, the 
majority of participants in this study viewed PBF favorably. This study found that con-
tracting dealt with the principal-agency problem by motivating health workers, develop-
ing indicators and providing performance incentives, thus addressing the laxness ob-
served in the public sector. PBF also provides useful support regarding the rationaliza-
tion of health management. Through promoting contract-based market principles and 
integrated management, PBF inputs not only help to attract new health staff, but also 
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improve task-oriented behavior. This study noted some progress in terms of behavioral 
change and good practices, such as readiness for financial accountability, commitment 
to quality, productivity and patient-centered care in the Katana HZ.  
In terms of demand-side empowerment, PBF gives power to communities through pro-
moting patient-centered care and recognizing communities’ rights to participate in the 
process of service provision as both clients and beneficiaries. PBF engages with CBOs, 
which, in turn, work to raise awareness within the community regarding their entitle-
ments. Active participation of the community in the process of verifying health facili-
ties’ performance records empowers the population as a key stakeholder in health ser-
vice management. It allows the interactive participation of the community, which is 
necessary to establish a more effective state–society relationship. Although the capacity 
to participate effectively for social accountability is still weak, the communities in Kat-
ana testified that PBF efforts raise social awareness on the relevance of their interactive 
participation in health service provision.  
Although there are many indications of positive effects, PBF interventions in the DRC 
face structural challenges that make achieving sustainability difficult. As a result, the 
approach remains confined to pilot experiments that so far fail to scale up. Many chal-
lenges are related to state fragility. PBF implementation relies mostly on inputs from 
external donors, which creates dependency and anxiety regarding their withdrawal. The 
MoH itself is dependent on donors’ financial incentives for implementing performance 
policy. Thus, at the moment, PBF seems to be about transactional, incentive-based mo-
tivation for the state at governance and management levels, as well as for providers at 
the grassroots level. It is challenging and time-consuming to move beyond transaction-
based motivation to create a real behavioral transformation among providers. Moreover, 
there is a need to further clarify the division of labor, an issue that was raised by many 
respondents as a critical way to prevent unpredictable outcomes related to conflicts of 
interest, multitasking, and unreliable reporting. In sum, it is costly to scale up and 
achieve sustainability in the absence of a working state. Strengthening the state’s will-
ingness and capacity is necessary for the success of any donor-inspired scheme. PBF 
supports health sector-based state-building, but it cannot repair a weak, corrupt state. 
Further research is needed on achieving transformational behavioral change in a context 
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1 During participant observation, the provincial health division and the provincial health inspectorate had 
not yet been separated in South Kivu. This finally took place in 2016. 
2 Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the Comoros, the Central African Republic, Chad, DRC, the Republic 
of Congo, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
3 See footnote 1. 
4 Interview, Bukavu, 11/11/2014 
5 Interview, Cordaid Office, Bukavu, 22/10/2013 
6 Interview, AAP, Bukavu, 11/11/2014 
7 Interview, Provincial ministry of public health, Bukavu, 03/11/2013 
8 Interview, Bukavu, 03/03/2015 
9 Only five offices had implemented PBF at the time of this study.  
10Interview, Kinshasa, 26/01/2014 
11 Interview, AAP, Bukavu, 11/11/2014 
12 Interview with medical doctor, Bukavu, 06/11/2013 
13 Interview, Katana, 11/04/2014 
14 Provincial Health Inspectorate records 
15 Interview, Katana HZ Admnistrator, Katana, 25/02/2015 
16 Interview, Bukavu, 03/10/2013 
17 Interview, Katana, 25/02/2015 
18 Interview, Bukavu 11/11/2014 
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